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Abstract: In On the Plurality of Worlds (Lewis 1986), David Lewis imposes a condition on realist 
theories of modality which he calls ‘plenitude’. Lewis apparently assigns this condition 
considerable importance, and uses it to motivate his Humean principle of recombination, but 
he never says exactly what plenitude amounts to. This chapter first sets aside some obvious 
ways of reconstructing the plenitude criterion which do not fit with the textual evidence. An 
objection to modal realism due to John Divers and Joseph Melia (Divers and Melia 2002) is 
diagnosed as equivocating between an overly-demanding plenitude constraint and a weaker 
constraint which fails to establish their conclusion. An alternative deflationary interpretation 
of the plenitude condition has it following from an application of standard theoretical virtues 
to a modal realist’s total theory; Lewis’ correspondence provides new evidence in support of 
this interpretation. The deflationary plenitude criterion also has broader application, beyond 




David Lewis devotes an entire section of On the Plurality of Worlds (Lewis 1986; henceforth, 
OPW) to a condition which he calls plenitude. Lewis tells us that we need ‘a way to say . . . that 
there are possibilities enough, and no gaps in logical space’ (1986: 89). Uncharacteristically, 
he does not give a clear statement of the plenitude criterion, despite appearing to treat it as 
an important methodological constraint on theories like his own modal realism. Instead he 
gives us a little intellectual autobiography, relating how he at first thought of plenitude as the 
requirement that the following conditions be satisfied: 
(1) Absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is. 
(2) Absolutely every way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that some part 




The problem with (1) and (2) (first pointed out by Peter van Inwagen (1980)) is that, once 
we make the modal realist’s proposed theoretical identification between worlds and ways 
things could be, (1) and (2) are rendered trivial. As Lewis puts it: 
(1) says only that every world is identical to some world. That would be true if there 
were only seventeen worlds, or one, or none. It says nothing at all about abundance and 
completeness. (1986: 86) 
(1), and likewise (2), cannot be salvaged as principles of plenitude. Let them go trivial. 
Then we need a new way to say what (1) and (2) seemed to say: that there are possibilities 
enough, and no gaps in logical space. (1986: 87) 
Lewis’s positive claims about plenitude in OPW are—perhaps intentionally—vague. All he 
says is that plenitude requires ‘abundance and completeness’ of worlds, and that we need a 
guarantee ‘that there are possibilities enough, and no gaps in logical space’. 
What is all this meant to mean? Does modal realism satisfy plenitude? And why care about 
the criterion in the first place? Answering these three questions—interpretive, metaphysical, 
and methodological—is the project of this paper. After a survey of the textual evidence, 
including Lewis’s recently-published correspondence, I look in §2 at some natural ways of 
reconstructing plenitude, and argue that none of them fit with what Lewis says about the 
criterion. John Divers and Joseph Melia have argued that modal realism fails to satisfy 
plenitude; in §3–5 I diagnose their argument as equivocating between an overly-demanding 
constraint and a more acceptable constraint which fails to establish their conclusion. In §6 I 
propose my own interpretation of plenitude, according to which it follows from the 
application of standard criteria on theory-choice to the modal realist context. Consequently, 
analogues of the plenitude criterion can be formulated in the context of any type of theory 
of modality (§7). §8 is a conclusion. 
 
2. Lewis on Plenitude 
A starting point in untangling Lewis’s discussion of plenitude in OPW is to streamline the 
terminology. His presentation strongly suggests that the requirement that there be 
‘possibilities enough’ is the same requirement as ‘abundance’, and that the requirement that 
there be ‘no gaps in logical space’ is the same requirement as ‘completeness’. In the two 




giving no indication that the subject is being changed; and it would seem somewhat bizarre 
if plenitude amounted to a conjunction of four distinct conditions. In what follows I will 
assume that these identifications were intended by Lewis. 
Nevertheless, the requirements we are left with are still problematically unclear. 
‘Abundant’ is a vague term in ordinary language, and cashing out ‘abundance’ as the 
requirement that there be ‘possibilities enough’ invites the question: enough for what? 
Likewise, ‘completeness’ is underspecified, and ‘no gaps in logical space’ is metaphorical. 
Such imprecision is unacceptable, given that Lewis apparently intends plenitude to be a 
substantive feature of his modal realism. We need a clearer statement of the requirements 
imposed by plenitude in order to assess whether it is a well-motivated constraint on candidate 
analyses of modality. 
How might we reconstruct Lewis’s conditions more precisely? Start with ‘abundance’, the 
requirement that there be ‘possibilities enough’.1 Lewis certainly thinks that no worlds, one 
world, and seventeen worlds would not be possibilities enough. So perhaps abundance is the 
requirement that there be, say, at least denumerably many worlds. By itself, this is insufficient 
to ensure the variety of possibilities that he envisages. A denumerable set of worlds which 
contained only qualitative duplicates of the actual world would be unable to provide plausible 
truth-conditions for our modal talk of the sort that Lewis is after. What we need is that the 
following requirement be satisfied: 
Diversity: A modal realist theory should entail that the members of the set of 
worlds manifest sufficient qualitative diversity. 
Of course, this condition is still underspecified: how much diversity, and in what respects, 
counts as sufficient? The requirement of Diversity is just a placeholder for a more refined 
 
 
1 It’s fairly clear that ‘possibilities’ here means ‘maximal qualitative possibilities’, rather than the notion of 
‘possibilities’ which Lewis discusses in his 1986: §4.4, where a possibility is a world plus an assignment of de re 
representation. One world may include infinitely many possibilities in the latter sense, and perhaps these 
infinitely many possibilities might be ‘enough’ for some purpose: but Lewis intends the notion of abundance 
to rule out there being exactly one world. His discussion of plenitude also comes long before the discussion of 




statement of the plenitude criterion. But rather than resolving the vagueness in the criterion 
any further, Lewis moves straight to introduce a principle designed to satisfy it. 
The principle of recombination, Lewis says, can ‘express’ (87) or ‘capture’ (92) plenitude: 
Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can coexist with anything else, at least 
provided they occupy different spatio-temporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to 
coexist with anything else. Thus if there could be a dragon, and there could be a unicorn, 
but there couldn’t be a dragon and a unicorn side by side, that would be an unacceptable 
violation of plenitude. And if there could be a talking head contiguous to the rest of a 
human body, but there couldn’t be a talking head separate from the rest of a human 
body, that too would be a failure of plenitude. (1986: 88) 
Motivated by concerns about conceptual circularity,2 Lewis transformed the above explicitly 
modal statement of the principle of recombination into the following principle about worlds 
(which is free of modal vocabulary): any two parts of any two worlds have duplicates which 
occur together in some world or another, and any two parts of one world have duplicates 
which occur on their own in some distinct pair of worlds. Lewis informally3 stated this non-
modal form of the principle as follows:  
PR:  ‘patching together parts of different possible worlds yields another possible 
world.’ (1986: 87–8) 4 
PR harmonizes with Lewis’ Humean outlook; when introducing it, Lewis made explicit 
appeal to Hume’s ‘denial of necessary connections between distinct existences’.5 
 
 
2 These concerns may not be well-founded. Cameron (2012) argues that there is no need to formulate the 
principle of recombination in non-modal terms, as long as the modality involved is itself amenable to the 
Lewisian analysis. I return to this point briefly in §7. 
3 The vagueness of ‘patching together’ can be precisified by invoking patterns of perfectly natural external 
relations, so that any parts of any world stand in any pattern of perfectly natural external relations (e.g. Lewis 
1987, 2009; see also Bricker 1996). A further refinement of PR might enable it to handle determinable 
properties; see §6 for more discussion. 
4 Lewis inserts a proviso, ‘size and shape permitting’  (1986: 89) for technical reasons relating to the limitations 
of a single space-time. This proviso will not be directly relevant to the arguments at hand. 




PR provides us with an important clue in interpreting plenitude. Whatever the criterion 
of plenitude amounts to, it must be a criterion which the truth of PR goes at least some way 
towards helping to meet. The simplest way in which the truth of PR could help to meet the 
plenitude criterion would be for PR itself to be constitutive of plenitude. Accordingly, one 
possible interpretation of plenitude simply identifies plenitude with the requirement that the 
postulates of modal realism should entail that PR is true: 
Combinatorial Plenitude: A modal realist theory should entail PR. 
Since recombination applied to the actual world immediately generates denumerably many 
worlds, with great variety amongst them, the suggestion that plenitude just is Combinatorial 
Plenitude has some initial plausibility. But this would be a bad interpretation of Lewis, for 
two immediate reasons. 
Firstly, it makes a mystery of why Lewis introduced the term ‘plenitude’ and glossed it in 
terms of ‘abundance’ and ‘completeness’. It would have been far simpler to title section 1.8 
of OPW ‘Recombination’, and to insist on PR directly as a criterion of adequacy on modal 
realist theories of modality. 
Secondly, Lewis is explicit in OPW that PR, applied to the actual world, fails to ensure 
that plenitude is satisfied: 
We can’t get the alien possibilities just by re-arranging non-alien ones. Thus our principle 
of recombination falls short of capturing all the plenitude of possibilities. (1986: 92) 
This is clear evidence against the interpretation of plenitude as Combinatorial Plenitude. PR 
might be necessary for the plenitude condition to be satisfied, but it is not sufficient; a fortiori 
satisfaction of PR cannot be constitutive of the plenitude criterion.  
Taking a step back, we can distinguish two theoretical roles that recombination principles 
might be playing in Lewisian modal realism. The first role for recombination—call it the 
independence role—is to express a Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct 
existences. To play the independence role, the principle of recombination simply has to be 
true of whichever worlds there in fact are. The second role for recombination—call it the 
generative role—is to characterize a theoretically interesting set of worlds when applied to some 
basic elements. To play the generative role, recombination needs a suitably rich set of basic 
elements to work with.  The passage just quoted suggests that Lewis conceived of plenitude 




turn from OPW to consider some remarks on plenitude from Lewis’s correspondence, in 
which Lewis explicitly considers candidates for supplementary principles of plenitude. 
Clear evidence that Lewis though recombination insufficient to ensure plenitude comes 
from Lewis’s letter to van Inwagen of 16 Feb 1983 (Lewis 1983a). In this letter Lewis first 
sketches the puzzle of plenitude, framing it in terms very similar to those he subsequently 
used in §1.8 of OPW. He then identifies a couple of ways in which recombination falls short 
of specifying the full plenitude of possibilities. First, he doesn’t want to apply recombination 
to obtain any conclusions about dimensionalities of possible space-times: 
I admit [a world with 5-dimensional space-time], but wouldn’t want to be driven to it 
just by Recombination. (1983a: 313) 
This suggests the need for principles other than recombination to ensure a suitable plenitude 
of dimensitonalities of possible spacetimes. Second, and perhaps more decisively, Lewis 
argues that recombination will never capture the full plenitude of alien possibilities: 
 . . . Recombination doesn’t give us the properties that contain really alien kinds of things 
. . . . So Recombination doesn’t wholly capture the abundance and variety of the worlds. 
(1983a: 314)6 
A third limitation of recombination is identified in a letter from Lewis to Hazen of 19 April 
1983; it pertains to the need for a plenitude of possibilities for determinate values of 
determinable properties: 
Maybe [some world that is a model of theory T] has a value, of some magnitude, that 
happens never to show up in [some other world that is a model of theory T]—as it were, 
a missing shade of blue. (1983c: 319–20) 
When OPW is read alongside Lewis’s correspondence, it becomes evident that he 
regarded plenitude as a substantive criterion which could not be satisfied simply by including 
 
 
6 This letter continues: ‘Does it capture the appropriate sense of completeness, that Peter especially needs and 
I also want? There, I think maybe so’ (1983a: 314). Here, Lewis is talking specifically about a rationalist argument 
due to Peter Unger which aims to establish that reality has no arbitrary features. Presumably Lewis’s idea is that 
PR by itself ensures that there is no arbitrariness in the possibilities concerning the distribution of any particular 





PR as part of the modal realist theory. Instead Lewis consistently looked beyond PR and 
canvassed other principles of a broadly generative character in order to help satisfy the 
plenitude criterion. We will return in §6 to the question of the methodological function of 
these principles. First, it is time to turn to a prominent recent objection to the Lewisian modal 
realist project: that no combination of generative principles available to modal realists can 
successfully satisfy plenitude.  
 
3. Divers and Melia on Completeness 
As part of their axiomatic reconstruction of modal realism, John Divers and Joseph Melia 
(2002) explicated plenitude as the requirement7 that the theory should ensure that the 
following condition is met: 
Completeness: [The set of all worlds contains] worlds of sufficiently many 
different types8 to represent all of the possibilities. (2002: 18) 
Completeness is presented as one of two corollaries of a methodological criterion which 
Divers and Melia call ‘Accuracy’. The other corollary is as follows: 
Consistency: [The set of all worlds contains] no worlds of any type that 
represents any impossibility. (2002: 18) 
What is required of a theory if it is to jointly satisfy completeness and consistency? On a 
straightforward reading of the principles, they require respectively that for any true 
proposition of the form p there must be a world according to which it is the case that p, 
and that for every true proposition of the form q there must be no world according to 
which it is the case that q. These requirements, however, go not at all beyond the trivial (1) 
and (2) which Lewis rejects as candidates to characterize plenitude. 
 
 
7 In fact, Divers and Melia take completeness to be a replacement for plenitude which improves on it by not 
carrying an implication that only cardinality of worlds is at stake. However, Lewis clearly did not intend any 
such implication, and the terminological shift seems to me to be unmotivated. 
8 In their formulation of these conditions, Divers and Melia make reference to types of world, rather than to 
worlds, because of a desire to allow for the possibility of duplicate worlds, about which Lewis was agnostic. 




 Completeness and consistency appear to jointly amount only to the statement Divers and 
Melia call ‘P’:  
P: p iff there is a world according to which it is the case that p. (2002: 
17) 
P is part of the modal realist analysis of modality,9 rather than a substantive condition on the 
adequacy of that analysis or of a wider theory incorporating that analysis. The truth of P is 
compatible with there being exactly seventeen worlds, for example. 
Did Divers and Melia miss this point? No; in the context in which completeness and 
consistency are presented, ‘representing a possibility’ seems to be intended to amount to 
representing something possible ‘by pre-theoretic lights’ (2002: 19). So Divers and Melia in 
fact interpret plenitude as the requirement that the modal realist ontology should include 
worlds which, via the biconditional P, secure the truth of all (or most) modal propositions 
that we pre-theoretically judge to be true and the falsity of all (or most) modal propositions 
which we pre-theoretically judge to be false. This conception of the burden on the modal 
realist is captured in a methodological criterion which Divers and Melia dub ‘Accuracy’ and 
take to be ‘one of the more general criteria of adequacy in analysis’: 
(i) that the ontological component of [Lewisian Modal Realism] generates a set 
of worlds that determines the truth-values of the existential claims about worlds 
that figure as the right sides of instances of P and 
(ii) that these truth-values should match the truth-values on the left-side 
possibility claims, these truth-values assigned – by and large – on the basis of our 
prior modal beliefs. (2002: 18) 
On this reading, Completeness and Consistency jointly express the requirement of Accuracy: 
a modal realist theory should entail truth-values for all modal propositions and that these 
truth-values should (‘by and large’) match the truth-values pre-theoretically assigned to them. 
 
 
9 In the light of issues surrounding ‘advanced modalizing’ (see Divers 1999, Parsons MS, Dorr MS), we must 
interpret ‘according to which’ as ‘such that, at that world’ rather than as an operator which restricts quantifiers 
in its scope to the world in question. Divers and Melia note this subtlety, but pay it no attention; it will be of 




There is some initial plausibility to the idea that Accuracy can provide the substantive 
aspect of plenitude which is lacking from Lewis’s (1) and (2), and from Divers and Melia’s 
P. Our pre-theoretic modal beliefs do, it seems, allow for a very large number of (maximal) 
possibilities, and for a very high degree of diversity among them. If we read ‘sufficiently’ in 
the requirement of Diversity as meaning ‘sufficient to (by and large) validate our prior modal 
beliefs’, then Accuracy looks like it might provide a plausible candidate for a non-trivial 
version of plenitude. 
As stated, however, Accuracy seems to be too strong a requirement. As well as limiting 
deviation from pre-theoretic modal opinion, the criterion of Accuracy requires that an 
acceptable modal realism should generate a set of worlds corresponding to this very large 
number of very diverse possibilities. Although it is unclear exactly what Divers and Melia 
intend by ‘generates’ it seems plausible that a necessary condition for some principles to 
generate a set of worlds is for the truth of those principles to entail the existence of the 
worlds in the set. Merely entailing that some worlds or other exist is not sufficient to generate 
a set of worlds in the intended sense. 
We can extract from this discussion a coherent interpretation of plenitude which is 
certainly a non-trivial requirement: 
Exhaustive Plenitude: The postulates of modal realism ought to entail the truth-
values of all modal propositions, and these truth-values ought to agree (by and large) 
with pre-theoretic modal opinion. 
Exhaustive Plenitude is a very demanding criterion; it requires both that an adequate modal 
realism must fix the contents of modal reality completely, and that the modal reality so fixed 
must be such as to vindicate most of our pre-theoretic modal opinion. Exactly how 
demanding it is depends on the notion of entailment that we take it to involve. 
Divers and Melia explicitly distance their notion of completeness from metalogical 
completeness, asserting that ‘we certainly do not expect [modal realism] to be able to prove 
every single modal truth’ (2002: 19). But, notice that this stops short of being a denial of 
Exaustive Plenitude; the notion of entailment involved in Exhaustive Plenitude need not 




according to which it does not impose the requirement of Exhaustive Plenitude; nor have 
Alexander Paseau or Ross Cameron.10 
What Divers and Melia seem to have in mind is a reading of ‘generates’ such that the 
postulates of modal realism can generate a set of worlds with a particular property without 
entailing exactly which worlds are included in the set. Even if we set aside the infelicity of 
this usage of ‘generates’, there is a further problem. The difficulty is that the property that 
they require the set to have—that it should vindicate (‘by and large’) our pre-theoretic modal 
opinions—itself entails a great deal about which worlds are included in the set. This difficulty 
may not be insurmountable: perhaps there is some gap between (on the one hand) entailing 
that there are enough worlds to ground most pre-theoretic possibilities and few enough 
worlds which ground any pre-theoretic impossibilities, and (on the other hand) entailing 
every single modal truth. In particular, there would be such a gap if the principles of modal 
realism did not entail either the truth or the falsity of any modal proposition other than those 
about which we have no particular pre-theoretic opinion. 
If we focus on agreement with pre-theoretic modal opinion and ignore the problematic 
implications of their term ‘generates’, then we can extract from Divers and Melia's discussion 
a condition that is much weaker than Exhaustive Plenitude. Rather than requiring that modal 
realism entail all the modal truths, this condition requires that it entail all of (or most of, 
given the ‘by and large’ qualification) the modal truths which are part of pre-theoretic modal 
opinion: 
Conservative Plenitude: The postulates of modal realism ought to a priori entail the 
truth-values of (most of) those modal propositions on the truth of which pre-
theoretic modal opinion delivers a decisive verdict, and these truth-values ought to 
agree (by and large) with pre-theoretic modal opinion. 
This formulation seems to capture the way in Divers and Melia apply Accuracy. For example: 
We follow Lewis in thinking it extremely plausible that there could have been 
alien natural properties. But once we allow this possibility, we can see that GMR, 
in its current formulation, is incomplete. . . . . [These considerations] suggest that 
 
 




the genuine modal realist needs to supplement the ontological component of his 
theory with an axiom that entails the existence of alien properties. (2002: 27–8) 
In this passage, Divers and Melia point out that pre-theoretic modal opinion allows for 
perfectly natural properties not instantiated at the actual world, and they use this to argue 
that modal realism must entail that there are worlds containing such properties. This looks 
like a straightforward application of Conservative Plenitude. 
Conservative Plenitude is a prima facie plausible interpretation of Lewis’s plenitude 
criterion. It performs several of the functions of plenitude, in ensuring that possibilities are 
many and various. It rules out all worlds being duplicates of one another, since we pre-
theoretically believe that things could have turned out differently. It rules out there being 
exactly seventeen worlds, since we pre-theoretically believe that there are more than 
seventeen distinct ways things could have turned out. And it can potentially be motivated 
through general criteria of adequacy in analysis. So it seems worthy of further consideration. 
Our analysis of Divers and Melia’s requirement of Accuracy has delivered two candidate 
interpretations of plenitude: Exhaustive Plenitude and Conservative Plenitude. It is not 
totally clear from Divers and Melia’s discussion which (if either) of the resulting criteria they 
endorse. However, the choice between the two criteria has crucial consequences for their 
overall argument. Divers and Melia’s goal is to argue that modal realism fails to be reductive: 
they claim that the only way to ensure that it satisfies the criterion of completeness is to add 
postulates which are explicitly modal and which thereby undermine the reductive project. To 
this end, they first argue that (their axiomatization of) modal realism does not satisfy 
Completeness. This argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
1. If the postulates of modal realism are true of a set of worlds, then that set is complete. 
(Supposed for reductio.) 
2. If the postulates of modal realism are true of a set of worlds S, then they are also true 
of a set of worlds S* which lacks all the worlds in S containing some arbitrary property 
P* that is not instantiated at the actual world. (Premise.) 
3. S represents a possibility which S* does not: the possibility that something is P*. 
(From 2.) 
4. The postulates of modal realism are true of S*, but S* is not complete. (From 3.) 




This argument has been challenged in various ways; see Paseau 2006 and Cameron 2012 for 
prominent objections. I will explain later in this section why I do not find it convincing. But 
for now, it will help us pin down what Divers and Melia intend by their criterion of Accuracy. 
Suppose that Accuracy were intended to impose the requirement of Exhaustive Plenitude. 
Then the argument just given would be superfluous. A much simpler argument would be 
available for the conclusion that modal realism fails to meet the criterion of Exhaustive 
Plenitude, starting from the assumption (which Divers and Melia grant, and which I will not 
question here) that we cannot refer to particular alien properties. That assumption yields the 
following shorter argument: 
6. For any property P not instantiated at the actual world, the postulates of modal realism 
do not either entail that it is possible that something is P or entail that it is not possible 
that something is P. (Premise.) 
7. If modal realism satisfies Exhaustive Plenitude, then for any property P the postulates 
of modal realism either entail that it is possible that something is P or entail that it is 
not possible that something is P. (Definition of Exhaustive Plenitude.) 
8. Modal realism does not satisfy Exhaustive Plenitude. (From 6 & 7.) 
It is obvious that modal realism does not satisfy Exhaustive Plenitude. Given that Divers 
and Melia take it to be non-obvious whether or not modal realism satisfies Accuracy, they 
cannot intend for Accuracy to be interpreted as imposing the criterion of Exhaustive 
Plenitude. 
Since the interpretation of their term ‘completeness’ as imposing the requirement of 
Exhaustive Plenitude fails to make sense of the dialectic of Divers and Melia’s paper, I will 
not consider this interpretation any further. I therefore turn to Conservative Plenitude. I will 
argue that, if we take Accuracy as imposing the requirement of Conservative Plenitude, then 
Divers and Melia’s central argument becomes invalid. 
Recall that Accuracy is supposed to factor into two components: completeness and 
consistency. Whether we interpret Accuracy as Exhaustive Plenitude or as Conservative 
Plenitude, we can derive the following principle: 
C-Completeness: If pre-theoretic modal opinion entails that ◊p, then (by and large) 





The difference between Exhaustive Plenitude and Conservative Plenitude is not captured by 
C-Completeness; it lies instead in the requirement, imposed by Exhaustive Plenitude but not 
by Conservative Plenitude, that modal realism should entail truth-values for all modal 
propositions. 
How does Divers and Melia’s argument fare if we replace their completeness criterion 
with C-Completeness? 
9. If pre-theoretic modal opinion entails that ◊p, then11 the postulates of modal realism 
entail that there is a world according to which p. (Supposed for reductio.) 
10. If the postulates of modal realism are true of a set of worlds S, then they are also true 
of a set of worlds S* which lacks all the worlds in S containing some arbitrary property 
P* that is not instantiated at the actual world. (Premise.) 
11. S represents a possibility which S* does not: the possibility that something is P*. 
(From 10.) 
12. The postulates of modal realism do not a priori entail that there is a world according 
to which something is P*. (From 11.) 
13. Reductio. (From 9 & 12.) 
The revised argument is invalid. (9) and (12) are perfectly consistent with one another, as 
long as pre-theoretic modal opinion does not deliver a decisive verdict on whether it is 
possible that something is P*. And it does not deliver any such verdict. 
Pre-theoretic modal opinion (we grant for the sake of argument) entails that there is no 
limit on the number of possible perfectly natural properties non instantiated at the actual 
world. But pre-theoretic modal opinion does not entail anything about specific perfectly 
natural properties not instantiated at the actual world. How could it? We could not be in a 
 
 
11 I am dropping the ‘by and large’ qualification to simplify the argument. But we can run the argument any 
number of times, making use each time of some new cardinality of properties in place of the single property 
P* used in the main argument. This, we may suppose, leads to enough distinct violations of pre-theoretic modal 




position to refer to any such property in our modal talk, or to grasp any such property in our 
modal thought.12 It follows that in order to capture C-Completeness, the postulates of modal 
realism need not distinguish between S and S*. To be valid, what the argument needs is an 
additional premise such as the following: 
14. For any proposition p, either the postulates of modal realism entail that ◊p or the 
postulates of modal realism entail that ¬◊p. 
(14) is entailed by Exhaustive Plenitude, but not by Conservative Plenitude. 
I conclude that Divers and Melia’s objection to modal realism fails. It seems to me that 
whatever plausibility it does have derives from an equivocation on ‘completeness’. For 
completeness to be a plausible constraint on modal realism, we have to understand it as 
motivated by Conservative Plenitude. But so construed, the inference from (3) to (4) fails. 
This inference goes through if we understand completeness as motivated by Exhaustive 
Plenitude, since Exhaustive Plenitude, via (14), licenses the move from ‘S is complete’ to ‘any 
set which lacks members of S is incomplete’; but then the premises of Divers and Melia’s 
argument are implausibly strong, and the argument is in any case redundant. On either 
interpretation of Accuracy, then, their argument is unpersuasive. 
I have argued that modal realism cannot satisfy Exhaustive Plenitude; but I do not think 
the modal realist should be worried by this conclusion. In the next section, I argue that 
Exhaustive Plenitude is an implausibly strong condition on modal realist theories, and that it 
was not what Lewis intended by his talk of plenitude.  
 
4. Against Exhaustive Plenitude 
Exhaustive Plenitude was not a constraint that Lewis himself accepted. He responds (1996) 
to an argument that his theory’s underspecification of the nature of modal reality leads to 
contradiction, defending the ‘modal mystery’ resulting from his modal realism and rejecting 
 
 
12 I set aside any cases of descriptive reference to alien properties: for example, via a description like ‘the alien 
property which most closely resembles charge’. Such reference requires descriptive resources richer than 
anything Lewis acknowledged. If preferred, the argument can be reformulated in terms of alien properties with 




a principle offered by Maudlin (1996) which leads to contradiction when combined with such 
modal mystery. It is unclear that Lewis even saw the phenomenon of modal mystery as any 
kind of cost of modal realism. In the following passage from OPW, he implies that it would 
be hubristic to think that we could settle all modal questions, even in the idealized limit of 
inquiry: 
On still other questions, there seems to be no way at all of fixing our modal 
opinions, and we just have to confess our irremediable ignorance. I think one 
question of this kind concerns natural properties. Is it absolutely impossible for 
one particle to be both positively and negatively charged? Or are the two 
properties exclusive only under the contingent laws of nature that actually 
obtain? I do not see how we can make up our minds; or what guarantee we have 
that there must be some way to settle the question. Certainly we are not entitled 
just to make the truth be one way or the other by declaration. Whatever the truth 
may be, it isn’t up to us. (1986; 114) 
Lewis sees no threat here to the reductive ambition of modal realism, implying that he did 
not accept Exhaustive Plenitude as a constraint on theories of modality. 
Exhaustive Plenitude is doubtful for reasons extending beyond the specific case of modal 
realism. Theories can be coherent and informative about some subject matter without 
entailing the truth-value of every proposition about that subject matter. A useful comparison, 
drawn by Cameron (2012), is with proposed analyses of ‘right action’ in meta-ethics. Act-
consequentialism says that the right action is the one which maximises total wellbeing. But 
act-consequentialism is silent on the question of which specific actions maximise total 
wellbeing. By itself, this is no objection whatever to act-consequentialism; we raise problems 
for the view only by arguing that in some specific situation S, act A maximises total wellbeing, 
but that nonetheless A is not the right action to perform in S. Act-consequentialism tells us 
what rightness consists in for actions: it does not tell us which particular actions are right. 
Likewise, we should only require of modal realism that it tell us what necessity and possibility 
consist in for propositions. Modal realism need not go on to specify which particular 
propositions are possible and which impossible. 
We can make similar comparisons from elsewhere in what Huw Price and Frank Jackson 
(1997) call the ‘M-worlds’. An account of the metaphysics of mathematics needs to say what 




But it does not need to say exactly which mathematical entities exist, or exactly which 
mathematical statements are true. That is a matter for mathematicians, not for 
metaphysicians. Likewise, an account of the metaphysics of mind needs to say what it is for 
some creature to be in some mental state, and perhaps what it is for some mental state to be 
conscious, perceptual, etc. But it does not need to say exactly which creatures are in which 
mental states, or exactly which mental states are conscious, perceptual, etc. That is a matter 
for psychologists, not for metaphysicians. I take it that considerations of this sort, applied to 
the modal case, undermine the requirement of Exhaustive Plenitude.  
We can usefully distinguish the project of analysing modality in modal realist terms from 
the project of providing a satisfactory total theory which incorporates modal realism. 
Adopting a realist analysis of modality need not involve taking on significant commitments 
about the extension of modal reality. All the analysis tells us is that where goes modal reality, 
there go the modal facts. Of course, we want more from an analysis of modality than that it 
should have the right logical form. We want some reason to adopt a total theory 
incorporating it. So even after rejecting Exhaustive Plenitude as a constraint on modal realist 
theories of modality, we may still expect modal realists to tell us various informative things 
about what modal reality is like, and hence about what is possible and necessary. Ross 
Cameron puts the point clearly: 
An account of what possibility is is one thing, an account of what is in fact 
possible another, and these two things shouldn’t be confused. Lewis owes a story 
about the extent of worlds, certainly; and the resulting account of what is possible 
had better not be too revisionary with respect to our pre-theoretic modal beliefs; 
but there should be no demand that this story about the extent of worlds fall out 
from the analysis . . . (2012: 10) 
The debt Cameron thinks Lewis owes us—a story about the extent of worlds which is 
not too revisionary with respect to our pre-theoretic modal beliefs—is in the close vicinity 
of Conservative Plenitude. In any case, the requirement of Conservative Plenitude looks like 





5. Lewis on Conservative Plenitude 
In the light of the foregoing, Conservative Plenitude looks like a promising interpretation of 
plenitude. Alas, Lewis explicitly rejects this way of giving content to the plenitude 
requirement: 
We might read (1) as saying that every way we think a world could possibly be is 
a way that some world is; that is, every seemingly possible description or 
conception of a world does fit some world. Now we have made (1) into a genuine 
principle of plenitude. But an unacceptable one. So understood, 1) 
indiscriminately endorses offhand opinion about what is possible. (1986: 87) 
. . . for a thesis of my position I’d like something that doesn’t just endorse 
unspecified modal opinion. Besides, I’m not so gullible as to think that all of us 
are wholly right about what ways a world could possibly be! (1983a: 313) 
Lewis here draws an implicit contrast between ‘offhand opinion about what is possible’ and 
informed, reflective opinion about what is possible. If plenitude goes with either of these, it 
goes with informed, reflective opinion. I take this to show that preservation of our pre-
theoretic modal beliefs, or of our ‘modal intuitions’, does not exhaust what Lewis took to be 
the requirements of plenitude. There must be some other component of plenitude, 
satisfaction of which requires substantive investigation or reflection, and which is sometimes 
capable of over-riding our pre-theoretic modal beliefs. 
Plenitude seems to be a matter of a theory’s consequences for the nature of the plurality. 
But it does not require that every detail about the plurality should be entailed. Nor does it 
require that the details about the plurality entailed should always match pre-theoretic modal 
opinion, or even ideally reflective modal opinion. Where does this leave us? 
 
6. Plenitude principles as laws of the plurality 
It fits well with Lewis’ moderately naturalistic methodology to apply the same criteria of 
theoretical goodness to theories in metaphysics that we apply to theories within theoretical 
science. (Whatever you may think of this sort of epistemological naturalism in metaphysics, 





As best we can, I think by seeking a theory that will be systematic and devoid of 
arbitrariness, we arrive at a conception of what there is altogether: the possible 
worlds, the possible individuals that are their parts, and the mathematical objects 
. . . . (Lewis 1986: 111) 
In the light of this general manifesto, one potential interpretation of plenitude is that it is not 
a sui generis requirement on modal realist theories, but is rather an application of some general 
criterion (or criteria) of theory choice to the specific question of which worlds there are. 
Lewis’s general account of theory-choice criteria in science is offered as part of his ‘best-
system analysis’ conception of the laws of nature as (roughly) the set of true universal 
generalizations about an individual world which strikes the best balance between simplicity and 
strength.13 But in the context of modal realism, the motivation for restricting the best-system 
account to apply only to individual worlds is unclear, and in apparent tension with 
methodological naturalism. There is no obvious reason why the best-system account must 
be restricted only to theories of the goings-on within individual worlds, and a natural thought 
is that the account might be applied to the modal realist theory itself. Doing so yields a set 
of true universal generalizations about the whole Lewisian plurality which strikes the best balance 
between simplicity and strength;14 call these laws of the plurality. 
According to the general Lewisian methodology I have described, a good theory 
incorporates a strong and simple set of laws. Accordingly, a good theory of modal reality will 
incorporate a strong and simple set of laws of the plurality. Could these laws, or some subset 
of these laws, correspond to ‘a genuine principle of plenitude’ of the kind which Lewis is 
seeking? Indeed, I think we can extract at least two candidate laws of the plurality from his 
discussion, both of which it seems reasonable to call principles of plenitude. The prospect 
of more than one principle of plenitude is in line with Lewis’ usage: to my knowledge he 
never talks of ‘the principle of plenitude’, or otherwise implies uniqueness. And in another 
 
 
13 See Lewis 1973: 72–7 for the original statement of the best-system analysis of lawhood. I set aside the 
extension to chancy laws which Lewis later proposed; laws of the plurality are presumably non-chancy. 
14 In the quote just given, Lewis talks of maximizing systematicity and non-arbitrariness instead of maximizing 
strength and simplicity. It seems likely that this is just a terminological variation on the theoretical virtues 




letter to van Inwagen, Lewis talks of upholding ‘principles according to which the pluriverse 
doesn’t have unduly arbitrary-seeming features’ and adds ‘[r]ecombination is such a principle, 
but it doesn’t do the whole job’ (1983d: 331). 
Lewis’s principle of recombination plainly scores well on both of the Lewisian criteria for 
lawhood. It is highly informative about the nature of modal reality. And it assures us that 
there will be no arbitrariness resulting from some world w containing some entities in some 
spatial arrangement, but no world containing duplicates of those entities in a spatial 
arrangement which differs only in acceptable ways from that at w. Hence the principle of 
recombination achieves an impressive balance between simplicity and strength. It surely 
counts as a principle of plenitude, if anything does; but as we have seen, Lewis explicitly 
states that recombination ‘falls short of capturing all the plenitude of possibilities’ (1986: 92). 
Although in OPW Lewis offers no additional candidate principle of plenitude, context 
strongly suggests that the remaining component of plenitude involves an abundance of 
possible perfectly natural properties, including alien properties. This impression is confirmed 
by Lewis’s correspondence from the period leading up to the writing of OPW, in which he 
states—albeit in negative form—a principle about modal reality which acknowledges its alien 
parts: 
You ask how I express the ‘seeming content’ to the effect that the plenitude of 
worlds outruns what you can get by recombination of the elements of actuality. 
How about: 
Some parts of some worlds are wholly alien to our world; that is, they are 
not duplicates of any parts of our world, nor are they divisible in such a 
way that all the parts into which they are divided are duplicates of parts 
of our world. (1983b: 318) 
One element which seems to be missing from this proposed formulation is a specification 
of cardinality—just seventeen perfectly natural alien properties would fulfil the above 
condition, for example. A cardinality condition would be straightforward to add to provide 
a more informative principle in the same vein, although the resulting principle might then be 
much harder—perhaps impossible—for us to know.  
Hence I would propose that the Lewisian laws of the plurality are (at least) twofold: that 




perfectly natural properties, including infinitely many which are alien to our actual world. The former 
is the principle of recombination; the latter we might call the principle of miscellaneity. I will not 
here attempt to make the principle of miscellaneity precise: that is a task for those who would 
elaborate specific modal realist worldviews. Divers and Melia have a relevant suggestion—
their ‘alien postulate’ (2002: 30). But beyond that, the problem of formulating a suitable 
principle of miscellaneity seems to have been unjustly neglected by modal realists. 
One might think that the principle of miscellaneity as stated above looks a poor candidate 
for a law of the plurality: it makes reference to a particular individual, the actual world, but 
we do not expect laws (of any variety) to refer to particular individuals (especially not to 
arbitrarily chosen particular individuals). This feature can potentially be removed by requiring 
that the principle of miscellaneity hold at all worlds, such that every world has infinitely many 
perfectly natural properties alien to it. It’s not clear, though, what Lewis would have made of 
this proposal, since his given reason in OPW for endorsing alien properties is that there is 
‘no reason to think we are privileged to inhabit’ an ‘especially rich world’ (1986; 92)—he does 
not argue that there is no especially rich world in the first place.  
Whether we formulate a principle of miscellaneity by specific reference to the actual world 
or not, problems may remain in ensuring rich enough property structures. Specifying the 
cardinality of the set of perfectly natural properties, even alien ones, still might not ensure 
abundance of the relevant kind: depending on how we exactly we choose to regiment 
determinate vs determinable properties within a broadly Lewisian system, it might be possible 
to meet the letter of any cardinality requirement simply with enough different determinates 
of one single determinable.15 Unsurprisingly, Lewis was alive to this concern, and makes an 
initial proposal aimed at resolving it in a letter to Hazen: 
OK; Recombination needs to be supplemented by some sort of principle of 
Inter/Extrapolation. (1983c: 319–20) 
There is some room for debate about whether such a principle of inter/extrapolation would 
be best seen as a supplement to PR, or whether the possibility of intermediary determinates 
might instead be derived from a suitably sophisticated recombination principle. That 
 
 




question is likely to turn on delicate issues in the metaphysics of quantities; we can leave it 
open here.  
Together with facts about the existence and nature of the actual world, the principle of 
recombination, the principle of miscellaneity, and a principle of inter/extrapolation seem 
sufficient to entail all of our uncontroversial pre-theoretic modal opinions. At least, they 
seem sufficient to entail all of the pre-theoretic modal opinions which motivate Divers and 
Melia. Perhaps, then, joint satisfaction of these three principles is constitutive of Lewis’s 
requirement of plenitude. 
On the interpretation I am proposing, the plenitude condition itself amounts to the 
requirement that modal realism should include a principle of recombination, a principle of 
miscellaneity and a principle of inter/extrapolation. This three-pronged requirement may 
then be understood as following from a more general methodological principle in the vicinity 
which I will call Plenitude*: modal realism should incorporate a plausible set of laws of the 
plurality, where lawhood is determined by simplicity and strength according to the same 
criteria as best-system laws of individual worlds. 
Plenitude*: A modal realist theory should entail a collectively plausible candidate set 
of laws of the plurality. 
This interpretation of Lewis as motivated to satisfy Plenitude* fits well with much that 
Lewis says about plenitude. To begin with, it makes good sense of the following passage: 
A world to which no individuals, worlds or properties are alien would be an 
especially rich world. There is no reason to think we are privileged to inhabit 
such a world. Therefore any acceptable account of possibility must make 
provision for alien possibilities... We can’t get the alien possibilities just by 
rearranging non-alien ones. Thus our principle of recombination falls short of 
capturing all the plenitude of possibilities. (Lewis 1986: 92) 
Lewis here tells us that ‘capturing’ plenitude requires us to ‘make provision for’ alien 
properties. The reason given is not that alien properties are intuitively possible—it is that we 
have no reason to think that our world includes all of the properties that there are. This 
suggests that plenitude includes the requirement that the ontology delivered by a theory of 
modality should be non-arbitrary. And this is captured by the simplicity condition built into 




world or set of worlds—those containing all and only the same perfectly natural properties 
as the actual world—would not be as simple as candidate laws lacking any such reference.  
Further evidence that Lewis thought of plenitude in terms of laws of the plurality comes 
from the following passage: 
Although recombination will not generate alien worlds out of the parts of this 
world, it nevertheless applies to alien worlds. It rules out that there should be 
only a few alien worlds. If there are some, there are many more. (Lewis 1986: 92) 
What is striking about these passages is that the restrictions imposed by plenitude in each 
case are conditional in form. They say that if there are worlds of a certain kind, then there are 
other worlds which can be generated16 from those worlds by certain acceptable 
transformations. If world A and world B only differ according to an acceptable 
transformation, then a theory of modality which allowed that A but not B exists would be 
arbitrary in the sense to be avoided.  
What an acceptable transformation is will depend on how we cash out the details of a 
modal realist theory. For Lewis, changing the spatial arrangements of any objects within a 
world is an acceptable transformation; so is duplicating any object in any world any number 
of times; so is any combination of these procedures. So too, it turns out, is combining 
duplicates of objects from distinct worlds in any spatial arrangement. In each case, the 
motivation for thinking that these transformations is acceptable is that there is nothing about 
any particular spatial arrangement A of entities E which could provide a reason why A is 
possible while a simple rearrangement of duplicates of E is not. (Whether we think that this 
motivation is a good one, of course, depends on what we think of Lewis’s Humean agenda.) 
The account of principles of plenitude as laws of the plurality makes sense of the 
conditionals invoked in these passages. In virtue of their strength, universal generalizations 
are natural candidates for lawhood. But universal generalizations entail specific conditionals: 
the universal generalization ‘all Fs are G’s’ entails, for every object O, that if O is F then O 
 
 
16 I am interpreting Lewis’ use of ‘generated’ here as metaphorical, rather than as signalling any sympathy for 
an anti-Humean interpretation of PR. The Humean account of lawhood seems to be an even better match for 




is G. In the light of this, any candidate principles of plenitude will entail a whole host of 
indicative conditionals: they will say that if worlds of some kind exist, then other worlds of 
that kind also exist. Failures of such conditionals, where they involve acceptable 
transformations, would lead to the ‘gaps in logical space’ which Lewis described plenitude as 
ruling out. 
It is interesting to consider the epistemological status of laws of the plurality. Lewis’s 
response to the question of how we acquire knowledge of the plurality of worlds is as 
ingenious as it is frustrating. He suggests that we can infer that particular other concrete 
worlds exist by combining the modal realist analysis with our pre-theoretic knowledge of 
what is and is not possible. This epistemological line, if cogent at all, can yield knowledge of 
the laws of the plurality. In order to allow for some fallibility in our pre-theoretic modal 
opinions, we may need to appeal to an inference to the best explanation in the move from 
the claim that recombination is roughly true to the claim that it is universally true. But if 
inferences to the best explanation of this sort are admissible in ordinary scientific contexts, 
as they appear to be, then epistemological naturalism suggests that they are equally admissible 
when it comes to the laws of the plurality. 
The Lewisian line of response to the epistemological argument has been widely 
criticized.17 But it is difficult to pin down the exact problem with it. One thought is that, for 
us to know there are enough worlds via this route, we would have to know that modal realism 
is correct; but we are not in a position to know modal realism is correct absent some reason 
to believe that recombination holds true. This line of response is developed by Cameron 
(2007); call it the epistemological-circle objection. If the epistemological-circle objection is 
successful, then the route to plenitude from the combination of the modal realist analysis 
with our prior modal beliefs is unavailable. But this is no objection to my claim that 
Plenitude* is a good interpretation of Lewis on plenitude. Since Lewis evidently thought his 
modal epistemology adequate to deliver knowledge about the worlds taken individually, he 
would have thought it equally adequate to deliver knowledge about the worlds taken 
collectively; that is, he would have thought his modal epistemology adequate to ground 
knowledge of laws of the plurality. 
 
 




The conception of plenitude that I have suggested is in a sense deflationary. Plenitude* is 
not a sui generis requirement on modal realist theories of modality; rather, it amounts to the 
application of general criteria on theory-choice which are motivated by reasons extending 
beyond the modal realist context. As such, on this interpretation plenitude needs no special 
methodological pleading—which makes sense of why Lewis does not engage in any. 
 
7. Plenitude beyond Lewisian Modal Realism 
Plenitude* extends straightforwardly to non-Lewisian versions of modal realism, for example 
to the Everettian modal realism defended in Wilson 2020 or to the inflationary-cosmology 
modal realism described in Knobe et al. 2006. Each of these theories comes with its own 
candidate for laws of the plurality. In Everettian modal realism, the Schrödinger equation 
and the initial quantum state play the role of the law of the plurality; in inflationary-
cosmology modal realism, the laws of the plurality are the inflationary dynamics and the 
initial state. 
But Plenitude* can also be extended to apply to non-modal-realist theories. Whatever 
(non-eliminativist) sort of theory of modality we prefer—ersatzist, neo-conventionalist, or 
modalist—we can formulate an analogue of the Plenitude* criterion. Adequate versions of 
each kind of theory ought to incorporate strong and simple general principles concerning 
what is and is not possible (while agreeing, by and large, with pre-theoretic modal opinion). 
This gives us: 
Generalized Plenitude*: A theory of modality should incorporate plausible general 
principles concerning what is and is not possible, and these principles should provide 
an optimal balance between simplicity and strength. 
Generalized Plenitude* is a constraint on a theory of modality that is orthogonal to the 
general character of the worlds. So Generalized Plenitude* is neutral on whether worlds are 
concrete individuals, or sets of sentences, or fictional individuals, or any other sort of thing. 
We might try to use Generalized Plenitude* as the basis for an argument in favour of 
modal realism. One of the main advantages that modal realists (whether Lewisian, Everettian, 
or inflationary-cosmological) claim over their ersatzist opponents is the reductive nature of 
their theories: modal realism promises an analysis of modality in non-modal terms. Other 




consistency between propositions. If Generalized Plenitude* is a legitimate requirement on 
theories of modality, then theories which take modality as primitive will need to include 
modal notions in the formulation of principles concerning what is and is not possible. 
The modal realist is in a position to state principles of plenitude in purely non-modal 
terms. Divers and Melia offer the following non-modal formulation of the principle of 
recombination, for example: 
For any individuals x1, x2, ... xn there is a world containing any number of 
duplicates of each, if there is a spacetime big enough to hold them all, and such 
that for any spatiotemporal relation the duplicates in question stand in that 
relation.18 (2002: 16) 
Ersatzist theories of modality, by contrast, are not able to provide equivalent principles 
without making use of modal notions. The ersatzist needs a modal formulation of 
recombination such as the one offered by Lewis: anything can exist with anything else. The 
modal realist might try to argue that this means that primitive modality must enter twice into 
the ersatzist theory: both in the ersatzist analysis of modality (as truth according to some 
consistent set of propositions) and in the ersatzist principle of plenitude (that anything can 
coexist with anything else). 
This line of argument is unlikely to succeed. Once ersatzists have paid the price for 
primitive modality in their analysis, they are in a position to apply the analysis directly to the 
principle of recombination. In general there is no need for a non-modal statement of 
principles of plenitude, as long as the modality involved in them is amenable to the same 
treatment as other modal claims.19 Unless we are given special reason to believe that a theory 
of modality cannot handle the modality involved in some candidate principle of plenitude, 
we ought to allow principles of plenitude to be formulated in modal terms. And so, as in the 
case of recombination, ersatzists can incorporate a principle of miscellaneity into their theory. 
Again, this postulate must be stated in modal terms; but this is to be expected, given that 
 
 
18 This formulation of recombination is contestable on several grounds. It shares with Lewis’s formulation a 
focus on individuals, so it imposes no recombination requirement on intrinsic monadic properties, and it also 
imposes no requirement on which spacetimes are possible. But it will suffice to make my point. 




ersatzists make no claim to a reductive theory of modality. Of course, Lewis famously used 
the possibility of alien perfectly natural properties to argue against ersatzism.20 But that 
problem is not that ersatzists cannot make sense of an infinitude of perfectly natural 
properties; it is that they are unable to make sense of merely quiddistic differences between 
pairs of worlds other than the actual world. 
The prospects of using Generalized Plenitude* to distinguish between different theories 
of modality thus appear poor. All of the theories of modality on the table can match the 
performance of modal realism with respect to Generalized Plenitude* just by incorporating 
appropriate principles of recombination and of miscellaneity. 
It may be possible to generalize plenitude* even further: 
Ultra-Generalized Plenitude*: Any metaphysical theory should incorporate 
plausible general principles concerning the extension of its subject-matter, and these 
principles should provide an optimal balance between simplicity and strength. 
It is plausible that Lewis acknowledged the force of some condition like Ultra-Generalized 
Plenitude* in metaphysical methodology. In his correspondence with van Inwagen, he 
compares the plenitude challenge facing modal realists with related challenges facing set 
theory (1983a) and facing the theory of properties (1983b). How are we to say that there are 
all and only the sets there are? How are we to say that there are all and only the properties 
there are? In this analogy, the individual principles of plenitude are analogous to set-theoretic 
or property-theoretic comprehension principles. For Lewis, all of these principles are chosen 
to maximise overall theoretical adequacy while minimizing arbitrariness. 
 
8. Conclusions 
I have now answered all three of the questions with which I began. In answer to the 
interpretive question, I have suggested that principles of recombination, of miscellaneity and 
of inter/extrapolation are jointly constitutive of Lewis’s plenitude criterion, and that this 
criterion can be motivated by the requirement that a modal realist theory should include a 
 
 




plausible candidate set of laws of the plurality. This allows us to give a positive answer to the 
metaphysical question: Lewisian modal realism does satisfy plenitude, by incorporating a 
plausible (although not precisely stated) candidate set of laws of the plurality. It also provides 
a basis for answering the methodological question: plenitude, thus interpreted, matters to us 
because it arises from an application of standard criteria of theory-choice to a modal realist’s 
total theory. This accords well with Lewisian methodological naturalism. The interpretation 
of plenitude proposed here thus makes sense of all of Lewis’s claims about the criterion, and 
of his motivation for proposing it; it also provides a principled basis for extending the 
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